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NOTES
THE NORTH DAKOTA MECHANIC'S LIEN
I. ORIGIN OF MECHANIC'S LIEN ACTS
The first statute giving materialmen and artificers a lien
upon property improved by their labor or supplies was enacted
by the Dakota Territorial Legislature in 1877.1 But similar
statutes were already widespread in other jurisdictions, and
the earliest enactment of this type was passed by the General
Assembly of Maryland in 1791.2 The purpose of this particular
legislation was to expedite the development of the city of
Washington by giving the master builder a lien on structures
that he built.
The mechanic's lien law was unknown to the common law
or the courts of equity, and originated in this country.3 A
form of it existed, however, in Roman law4 and was incorpor-
ated in the Code Napoleon. 5 As commercial activity increased
in the United States, mechanic's lien acts were increasingly
enacted. Every state today has such a law in one form or an-
other.6 The history and evolution of such acts are purely stat-
utory in character, and in consequence the construction given
to any provision is normally determined by the local conditions
existing at the time. Since local policy and conditions do much
to dictate the terms of such statutes, resort to each particular
locality must be had before any precise analysis may be ven-
tured.
II. BASIC THEORY AND OPERATION
Mechanic's lien laws have been generally grouped into two
basic categories: (1) the New York type and (2) the Penn-
sylvania type." The distinction between the two types of stat-
utes lies in the nature of the lien given to each of the various
lien claimants. Under the Pennsylvania type, subcontractors
and materialmen are given a direct lien on the improvement
1. C. Civ. P., 1877 § 655.
2. Acts of General Assembly of Maryland, 1791, ch. 45, § 10.
3. See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 564 (1951).
4. MACKELDY, HANDBOOK OF THE ROMAN LAW, 274 (Dropsie's
Translation).
tion, 274.
5. Code Napoleon, Privileges and Mortgages, § 2 (2103).
6. Supra note 3.
7. See generally OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 566 (1951).
8. Ibid.
and the property, i.e., the lien is not dependent for its exis-
tence upon the presence of an unfulfilled contract obligation
between the owner and the general contractor. 9 This means
that under certain conditions payment to a general contractor
will not extinguish the possibility of a subsequent assertion
of a mechanic's lien, and double liability may at times occur.
The New York type, which is the most prevalent, limits the
liability of the property by the amount of the original con-
tract only. Under statutes of this type the liens of subcon-
tractors and materialmen are indirect rather than direct,1, and
the chance that a property owner may be compelled to pay
twice for improvements on his property is eliminated.
In 1961 the North Dakota Legislative Assembly enacted
new legislation substantially revising the previous law re-
garding mechanic's liens. This legislation is of the Pennsyl-
vania type.1 It provides that "Any" person who improves
real estate ... whether, under contract with the owner of such
real estate, or at the instance of any agent, trustee, contractor
or subcontractor of such owner, shall have a lien .... ",12 More-
over, the lien may be perfected 90 days after the date on which
a subcontractor or materialman last furnishes supplies or
labor.1 3 As between the materialman and the owner the new
statute creates a lien on the property the moment the first item
of material or labor is furnished. 14 As between the material-
man and a subsequent encumbrancer or purchaser, the lien has
priority from the beginning of visible construction or altera-
tion of the property.15 The above fact emphasizes the impor-
tance of clearly ascertaining the status of mechanic's liens
upon the property in the course of title examinations, both by
careful search of the appropriate records and factual examina-
tion of the premises. It should be observed that one conse-
quence of the Pennsylvania type enactment is to shift the
economic risk of the general contractor's insolvency from the
materialman to the property owner.
9. This type of statute generally provides that liens in the aggregate
cannot total more than the general contract so as to preclude the pos-
sibility of the claims of ancillary contracts from exceeding original con-
tract. See N.D. Cent. Code § 35-12-07 (1961).
10. See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 566 (1951).
11. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-27 (Supp. 1961); see Robertson Lumber Co. v.
State Bank of Edinburg, 14 N.D. 511, 105 N.W. 719 (1905).
12. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-27-02 (Supp. 1961).
13. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-27-13 (Supp. 1961).
14. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-27-,03 (Supp. 1961).
15. Ibid.
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Generally, the lien attaches to the interest of the contracting
owner in the land, as well as to the improvement itself. 6 This
was so under the old statute as well. 1 7 In addition, the lien may
extend to the interest or estate in land of one not a party to
the contract in some cases. Thus, where a contract for the
sale of land requires the vendee to make improvements on the
property, and the vendor subsequently repossesses the prop-
erty, the lien can attach to the vendor's title. 8 Similarly, when
one person goes onto the land of another and makes improve-
ments thereon, the owner is deemed to have authorized such
improvements unless objection to them is made as required by
statute.19 This provision has been vehemently criticized as un-
constitutional in at least one study, 20 on the ground that it ren-
ders a property owner liable for improvements to which he has
not consented and thus deprives him of property in an arbi-
trary manner.
III. OPERATION OF PRIOR STATUTE
Before undertaking a detailed examination of the new en-
actment, the operation and effect of the prior statutes deal-
ing with mechanic's liens in North Dakota should be consider-
ed briefly. This is particularly true because the new statute
incorporates many pre-existing statutory provisions into the
law. Thus the term "owner" is defined by the new statute
in the same terms as the earlier one.2 1 It means every person
for whose immediate use and benefit any building, erection, or
improvement is made. Under this definition an "owner" has
been held to be a vendee under a contract of purchase,
2
2 a ven-
dor who retains an undivided portion of the land and ac-
quiesces in an improvement thereon, 23 and a person entering
under the Homestead Act, even though under the terms of the
Homestead Act the land was not liable to liens.
2 4 Conversely,
under the old statute a vendor under an executory contract for
16. N.D. Cent. Code §§ 35-27-02 (Supp. 1961), 35-27-19 (Supp. 1961).
17. N.D. Cent. Code §§ 35-12-03, 35-12-16.
18. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-27-07 (Supp. 1961).19. Ibid.
20. See Myhre, Fiction, Fallacy and Facts In Relation to "Implied Con-
sent" Provisions of Certain Mechanics' Lien Statutes, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 559(1948).21. Compare N.D. Cent. Code § 35-12-01 with N.D. Cent. Code §
35-27-01 (Supp. 1961).
22. Salzer Lumber Co. v. Claflin, 16 N.D. 601, 113 N.W. 1036 (1907).
23. Vicker v. Beggs, 53 N.D. 858, 208 N.W. 383 (1926).
24. Mahon v. Surerus, 9 N.D. 57, 81 N.W. 64 (1899). The court reasoned
that the materialman had a lien against the building as a distinct right
and not dependent upon the land.
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the sale of land did not have an interest to which a mechanic's
lien could attach.25 Under the prior statute a person was en-
titled to a lien if he furnished labor or materials for the im-
provement or erection of any buildings upon lands under con-
tract with the owner, his agent, contractor or subcontractor,
to secure the payment for his contribution..21; The substance of
this section was incorporated into the new act with some
slight alteration in the wordingY.
Section 35-12-03 of the old act did not precisely state when
the lien arose but merely stated that the contributor was "en-
titled" to a lien upon compliance with the provisions of the
chapter. The lien is inchoate until perfected by requiring the
contributor to: (1) keep a separate itemized account, (2)
make a written demand for payment fifteen days prior to fil-
ing the lien, (3) file with the clerk of court a notice of the per-
son in possession, describing the land, contract date and stat-
ing that a lien will be perfected if payment is not received.2s
A failure to file the lien within the statutory ninety days does
not defeat the lien except for payments made by the owner
after the ninety days and before the lien is filed.20  The re-
pealed act also required the materialman furnishing materials
to a contractor to notify the owner by registered mail that he
is about to furnish such materials. 30 A significant change in
the new law occurs at this point and will be discussed later.
Nevertheless, the rationale behind this notice was clear; it is
only fair that the owner be informed of who and how nany
persons had potential interests in his land and improvement.
For this reason the mechanic's lien acts have been sometimes
referred to as "secret liens". Under the old act, the possibility
of the owner being held liable for liens exceeding the amount
of the original contract was mitigated by section 35-12-07
which limited the owner's total lien liability by the amount of
the original contract. When the owner contracted directly
with the materialman the notice provision is not required.31
The account required to be filed within ninety days had to
contain the amount of the lien and a description of the land
25. Johnson v. Soliday, 19 N.D. 463, 126 N.W. 99 (1910).
26. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-12-03.
27. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-27-02 (Supp. 1961).
28. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-12-04.
29. Robertson Lumber Co. v. State Bank of Edinburg, 14 N.D. 511, 105
N.W. 719 (1905).
30. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-12-05.
31. Pudwill v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 89 N.W.2d 424 (N.D. 1958); North
Dakota Lumber Co. v. Bulger, 19 N.D. 516, 125 N.W. 883 (1910).
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to be charged.32 A clerical error concerning the amount of the
lien did not disturb its validity,3 3 but it has been held that a
misdescription of the land will create no charge upon the
land.3 4 It is well settled that a misdescription does not create
a lien and to do so would be an unreasonable burden upon the
third party.
A lien was authorized upon multiple improvements and par-
cels of land if the contribution was made under a single con-
tract.3 5 If the various improvements were on separate lands
the lien will attach also, but upon foreclosure the court could
apportion, if such was necessary to protect the rights of third
parties.3 6 Thus it was held in State Loan Co. of Minneapolis v.
White Earth Coal Mining, Brick and Tile Co.,5 7 that a lien at-
tached to land which was actually never improved. Defendant,
a coal company, owned a quarter of section 15 and in addition
leased a contiguous quarter of section 16. It had a coal mine
on section 15. Another defendant, an elevator company, furn-
ished materials to the coal company for the erection of build-
ings near the coal mine. The buildings were actually erected
on section 16, the leased site, however, it was conceded by all
that they conferred an improvement to the coal mine on sec-
tion 15. A month after the materials were furnished, plaintiff
took a mortgage from the coal company on the quarter section
of 15, but upon recording the mortgage designated the SW1/4
instead of the NW1/4 . This mistake remained for three years
and was then corrected. Two questions were presented to the
court: (1) did the elevator-materialman have a lien on section
15 and, (2) was it prior to the mortgage of plaintiff? The
court answered in the affirmative on both questions stating
that the materials were for the improvement of section 15 and
therefore the lien attached. As to the priority of the mortgage,
the court stated that not until the error was corrected was
there notice as to third parties. The dissent, which contended
that the same result would have obtained without this unwar-
ranted construction of the statute, reasoned that a contract to
32. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-12-10.
33. Robertson Lumber Co. v. Swenson, 24 N.D. 134, 138 N.W. 984 (1912).
34. Kuntz v. Partridge, 65 N.W.2d 681, (N.D. 1954); Sarles v. Sharlow, 5
N.D. 100, 37 N.W. 748 (1888).
35. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-12-14; Robertson Lumber Co. v. Swenson, 24 N.D.
134, 138 N.W. 984 (1912).
36. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-12-14.
37. 34 N.D. 101, 157 N.W. 834 (1916).
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furnish materials could not constitute notice to the plaintiff
and that furthermore section 15 was never improved.
The act not only confers a lien upon the improvement and
the land necessary to its foundation but the entire land to the
extent of all the right, title and interest of the owner . 3  This
is so even if the materials intended to be used never in fact
found their way into the improvement. 39 Homestead land has
been held not subject to a lien but the building erected upon
the land would be. 40 Another example is a leasehold interest
where upon forfeiture by the lessee the lien attaches to the
building and it may be removed and sold.
41
The old act appears fair and equitable in its operation with
the filing and notice provisions being the source of difficulty
in many cases. The new statute, 35-27 will now be noted and
the changes emphasized.
IV. THE NEW STATUTE
The new statute preserves the basic type of lien provided for
in the old law, namely the Pennsylvania type.42 However, some
of the incidents have been changed, some for the better and,
it is submitted, some for the worse. Many of the new provi-
sions were taken from the Minnesota statute,4 3 therefore cita-
tions construing those provisions from that state should be in
order.
Section 35-27-03 leaves no doubt that the lien attaches, as
against the owner, when the first materials are delivered upon
the premises. As against third parties without notice the lien
attaches when the actual and visible construction has com-
menced. Clearly set out in the next section is the provision
that in the event of a good faith mortgage given for the pur-
pose of paying for the improvement such mortgage shall have
priority even though the mortgage is recorded subsequent to
the visible beginning of the work but prior, to the filing of a
notice of intention to claim a lien.44 This section was not in-
cluded in the old statute but seems desirable since the very
38. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-12-16.
39. McCaull-Webster Elevator Co. v. Adams, 39 N.D. 259, 167 N.W. 220
(1918).
40. Supra note 24.
41. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-12-20; Gull River Lumber Co. v. Briggs,
9 N.D. 485, 84 N.W. 349 (1900).
42. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-27-02 (Supp. 1961).
43. Minn. Stat. Ann., ch. 514 (1945).
44. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-27-04 (Supp. 1961).
1962]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
reason for a mechanic's lien law is to give security for money
expended to improve land while still preserving the right of a
lienor to file his claim. While the statute seems clear, the
mechanic's lien law as it affects purchase-money mortgages
and building and loan mortgages is both interesting and com-
plex and a discussion of these conflicting claims will be re-
served until later.
The filing of a notice of intention to claim a lien is substan-
tially the same as in the old statute.45 The only difference is
that under the new law the filing of notice of intention and
the itemized account and demand conditions precedent to ob-
taining the lien are separated into two sections. 46 Compliance
with the three sections on (1) filing the notice of intention,
(2) itemized account and demand conditions and, (3) filing of
the account, changes the lien from an inchoate form to a per-
fected form. These requirements are essentially the affirma-
tive or objective steps that the lien claimant must take to se-
cure the mechanic's lien. It can be easily seen that great care
was taken by the creators to insure that the lienor be required
to give the widest possible notice to third parties which may
be a concession in mitigation of the priority of mechanic's
liens.
A significant change in the new law occurs in the section on
the extent and amount of the lien.4 7 As will be recalled, an
earlier discussion noted that the old act limited the amount of
the owners liability by the original contract. This section pre-
cluded the owner from being held by various liens in excess
of his deal with the general contractor,48 the rule being that
he ought not to be held for more that he bargained for. The
new section merely states that if the contribution is under
contract with the owner the lien shall be for the amount of
the contract. Otherwise it shall be for the reasonable value of
the work done. 9 It is submitted that this section does not at-
tempt to limit in any way the owners liability to the original
contract price. Indeed, it appears not to say anything, since
without a contract the reasonable amount of the contribution
would always be the measure and to say that when there is a
45. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-27-05 (Supp. 1961); see Red River Lumber Co.
v. Friel, 7 N.D. 46, 73 N.W. 203 (1897).
46. N.D. Cent. Code §§ 35-27-05, 35-27-11 (Supp. 1961).
47. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-27-06 (Supp. 1961).
48. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-12-07.
49. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-27-06 (Supp. 1961).
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contract the stated price shall govern is merely stating the ob-
vious. The value of the section would seem merely to be an af-
firmation that the general contract will not govern the aggre-
gate amount of the liens and such has been the construction
placed upon it in the Minnesota Courts.50 Therefore, it may be
safely said~that our new statute does not limit the liability of
the property by the amount of the contract.
A new section appears that was apparently taken from the
Minnesota statute.51 The section concerns the liability of the
title of a vendor under an executory contract; the consent of
owners and lessors to improvements. 52 An executory contract
that requires the vendee to improve the land subjects the title
of the vendor, upon forfeiture, to the lien. Also, when one
person performs labor or furnishes materials upon another's
land, that owner is deemed to have consented to the improve-
ments unless he objects by written notice within five days af-
ter he first acquires knowledge of the work or by posting a
notice on the premises. This provision would not include prior
bona fide encumbrancers or lienors. A lessor will not be held
liable by this section where the lessee makes unauthorized
improvements unless the lessor shall have actual or construc-
tive notice.
A new section appears in the new statute titled, "Payment
to contractors withheld", 53 and provides that an owner may de-
duct so much of the contract price as may be necessary to meet
the demands of other persons having a lien on the premises for
which the contractor is liable. In addition, any person having
a lien may serve upon the owner a notice of his claim. The
owner may, within fifteen days of completion of the contract,
require the person having the lien under the contract to furnish
him an itemized statement and that no action for the fore-
closure of the lien may be commenced until ten days after the
statement is furnished._4 A Minnesota case, First Church of
Christ, Scientist v. Lawrence,55 held that where original con-
tract required the owner to pay 85 per cent each month of the
cost of materials and labor furnished, only that part of the la-
bor and materials furnished by the subcontractors that was
60. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 514.03; Laird v. Noonan, 32 Minn. 358, 20 N.W.
354 (1884).
51. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 514.06 (1945).
52. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-27-07 (Supp. 1961).
53. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-27-09 (Supp. 1961).
54. See Clark v. Anderson, 88 Minn. 200, 92 N.W. 964 (1903).
55. 210 Minn. 37, 297 N.W. 99 (1941).
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actually paid for by the contractor himself would be allowed.
The reason for this statute is clear and would seem to be a fa-
vorable addition to our new act. The defaulting contractor
would certainly increase the possibility of more liens being
brought against the owner's property. This is especially true
in the "Pennsylvania type" jurisdictions such as North Da-
kota where there is no section that limits the aggregate
amount of the liens to the contract price. It must be remem-
bered that the ninety day period merely gives priority to me-
chanic's liens over other encumbrances and that as between
the owner and the lienor the lien could exist indefinitely and
is diminished only to the extent of payments made to the con-
tractor after the ninety days. 56
A new section appearing in the statute concerns inaccura-
cies in the lien statement and provides in substance that in no
case shall liens given by this chapter be affected by any inac-
curacy in the particulars of the lien account. 57 Lien statement
is synonomous with the lien account and it should be noted that
the lien account includes among other things the name of the
person against whose property the lien is claimed and a de-
scription of the property to be charged. This would seem to
indicate that an inaccurate description of the land would not
affect the validity of the lien as to subsequent encumbrancers
in good faith. Although it was obviously not the intent of the
legislature to charge land with a lien when the record did not
disclosure that such a lien existed, nevertheless such a con-
struction is possible by reading this section. It was held by
our Supreme Court in Sarles v. Sharlow,58 that a mistake in
the description of the land creates no charge upon the land.
If notice is the essence of priorities, it would seem unjust to
hold the lien valid and it is submitted that no such intent ever
existed. The purpose of the section is apparently to preserve
the substantive rights of the parties when an insignificant
error arises. This is advisable in view of the strict application
of the provisions of the law by our courts.
The section on priority of classes of mechanic's liens is sub-
stantially the same as the old except for an additional provi-
sion allowing liens for materials to share ratably in the secur-
56. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-27-14 (Supp. 1961).
57. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-27-16 (Supp. 1961).
58. 5 N.D. 100, 37 N.W. 748 (1888).
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ity when they are filed within the ninety day period 9 Prior
to this the section only applied to liens for labor filed within
the ninety day period.6O The only apparent effect of the ad-
dition is that now if a materialman's lien is filed within the
ninety day period, he would share ratably with any other
materialman who filed within this period whereas before a
materialman's lien had priority in the order of filing.
V. PRIORITIES
As noted in Section 35-27-03 a mechanic's lien does not at-
tach, as against bona fide purchasers, mortgagees or other en-
cumbrancers without notice until the actual and visible con-
struction begins. This means, of course, that any recorded
mortgage that is prior to this visible construction will prevail.
The only exception to this is that when the mortgage is given
to provide funds for the building or improvement, no me-
chanic's lien shall be given priority even though such mort-
gage is recorded after the lien attaches but before the lienor
has filed his intention to claim a lien.61 Section 35-27-03 ex-
pressly provides that a lien shall be preferred to any unrecord-
ed prior mortgage unless the lienor had actual notice and if
the mortgage was not for the purpose of creating funds for
the improvement.
There are generally two views as to priorities concerning
improvements: (1) That all improvements to mortgaged land
such as new buildings, improvements upon the old, feed the
mortgage and that such mortgage would be prior to a me-
chanic's lien on both the land and the improvement. (2) The
other view is that while the priority as to the original mort-
gaged land is preserved, the mechanic should be entitled to a
lien upon improvement he has created. The rationale is that
since he created the improvement he should have first claim
to repayment for his labor.6 2 The mechanic's lien in North Da-
kota attaches not only to the improvement but also to the land
upon which the improvement is situated.6 3 But as to liens upon
improvements on mortgaged premises the court held in Dun-
ham Lumber Co. v. Gresz,6 4 that in certain cases the mortgage
59. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-27-22 (Supp. 1961).
60. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-12-19.
61. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-27-04 (Supp. 1961).
62. See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 571 (1951).
63. N.D. Cent. Code §§ 35-27-02 (Supp. 1961), 35-27-19 (Supp. 1961).
64. 71 N.D. 491, 2 N.W.2d 175 (1942).
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is prior and in others the lien will prevail. Thus, the State of
North Dakota took a mortgage on a one-half section of land
in 1927 and the owners in 1930 purchased materials from the
plaintiff for the purpose of erecting a house on the mortgaged
property. The state contended that it's mortgage attached to
the house as it was being constructed and at all times was su-
perior and prior to the mechanic's lien. Intervening between
the time of the mortgage and the purchase of the materials, the
legislature amended the lien act so as to provide that a me-
chanic's lien for any original, independant structure or im-
provement, whether placed upon foundation or not should be
prior to any other encumbrance.", The state contended further
that to give the lien priority would be to impair the mort-
gagee's contract obligation. The plaintiff asserted that inas-
much as the new house was erected after the amendment, the
legislature had the power to change the law and give the lienor
this priority without impairing either contractual or vested
rights. The court held that the purpose of the statute was to
intervene in favor of the lienor to give him security for the
fruits of his labor and that to give him priority as to the house
alone in no way affected or diminished the interest of the
mortgagee. He had what he started with and to give him the
additional security of the improvement would be to award the
mortgagee a windfall and deprive the materialman of any se-
curity whatsoever. The court stated further that the statute
operates as though it were an agreement between the landown-
er and the materialman to the effect that the building should
remain personal property. It thus prevents annexation as
against the claim of the mortgagee, to which all other types of
accessions insure.
We can thus see that as to a complete and independent struc-
ture or improvement, North Dakota adheres to the latter rule
enunciated above. By implication or otherwise it can be seen
that where the improvement is of such a nature as to injure
the interest of the mortgagee if separation should be ordered,
the mechanic's lien priority would not arise.6 6 In fact, the
court stated directly that all annexations that are considered
realty would feed the mortgage; the view taken first above.
But for this exception, the rule in North Dakota is that a prior
65. N.D. Cent. Code § 35-27-21 (Supp. 1961).
66. See Dunham Lumber Co. v. Gresz, 71 N.D. 491, 2 N.W.2d 175 (1942);
James River Lumber Co. v. Danner, 3 N.D. 470, 57 N.W. 343 (1893).
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recorded mortgage is superior to a subsequent mechanic's
lien.
Generally, if a vendor's security interest is recorded and he
has not authorized improvements either expressly or implied-
ly, his interest is not subject to the lien.67 However, as noted
before, the new act puts an affirmative duty upon the vendor
to disclaim any responsibility for the improvement by posting
notices within five days after he acquires knowledge.
Section 35-12-12 concerning priorities of mechanic's liens is
not present in the new act. The old section provided that a lien
obtained under that chapter would have priority as against all
other liens or encumbrances as follows: (1) If the lien is for
labor, it shall have priority over any other encumbrance filed
or docketed subsequent to the commencement of the improve-
ment and (2) if the lien is for materials it shall have priority
as against liens filed or docketed subsequent to the filing of
the notice of intention. The last subsection (2) is ambiguous
when read together with the main body of the section. The
main body states that the mechanic's lien shall have priority
over all encumbrances upon the building and the land as fol-
lows, and then goes on to state in subsection two that one lien
will have priority over another lien (not other encumbrances)
if such subsequent lien is filed or docketed subsequent to the
filing of the notice of intention of the first lien. If the section
was originally intended to give a mechanic's lien priority over
a mortgage under certain conditions, it was never effectual for
the courts have held that improvements on existing buildings
covered by a mortgage would be for the benefit of the mort-
gagee and not for the lienor.
6 8
VI. CONCLUSION
One can easily see from what has been said that a mechanic's
lien act is a very technical and complex piece of legislation.
Decisions of other jurisdictions are of little value unless the
provisions of the act are identical and then they may not be too
reliable.
The new North Dakota Mechanic's Lien Act does not alter
the basic type of lien i.e., the Pennsylvania type: However, the
exclusion of the provision that the total of the liens shall not
exceed the amount of the original contract is significant be-
67. See Priority of Mechanic's Liens in Iowa, 45 Iowa L. Rev. 813 (1960).
68. See Supra note 67.
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cause it shifts the burden of a defaulting contractor from the
materialman and subcontractors to the property owner. A new
provision allows an owner to withhold so much of the contract
price as may be necessary in order to satisfy any ancillary
claims for materials. A provision of this type is needed, espe-
cially with the absence of the "aggregate lien" section. But
there is no question that with respect to these sections the bur-
den of the defaulting contractor and the duty to search for
possible lien claimants is shifted to the property owner.
Under the old act the lien attached when the lien claimant
filed his notice of intention to perfect the lien. The new stat-
ute creates a lien immediately upon furnishing the materials
upon the premises. At this point the lien is inchoate and is
perfected in the same manner as provided for under the pre-
vious law.
The new statute is explicit about who is entitled to a lien,
when the lien attaches and the extent and amount of the lien
and, when compared to the old, is much easier to read and un-
derstand. From a drafting standpoint the old act left much
to be desired.
Probably the most significant change in the new law is the
deletion of the requirement that the materialman give notice
to the owner when he is about to furnish materials. Under
this deleted section the owner was always aware of who might
claim his property as security for furnishing materials for his
improvement. And non-compliance with this section prevent-
ed the perfection of the lien. As it now stands, the property
owner has the duty to ascertain who the possible claimants
might be; a result that seems totally unjustified and appears
quite illogical. The materialman always has within his know-
ledge or can easily secure the name of the owner, but it is quite
a different matter when the property owner must be on guard
to inform himself of the various suppliers. This is especially
true when construction projects are large and suppliers by
the score may be involved.
It would be indeed difficult to draft a mechanic's lien law
that would contemplate every conceivable question. In many
respects the new statute embodies desirable additions and re-
formations. To the extent that it does not, it reflects the need
for the services of the Legislative Research Committee on most
types of proposed legislation.
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